The mechanism of division as a tool for maintaining power

In 2016, Turkish society reached a record level of mutual alienation. For one part of the population, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan remains the guarantor of state sovereignty; for another, he embodies a departure from legal norms and an authoritarian style of governance.

The ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has, since coming to power, abandoned the search for public consensus, opting instead to strengthen its own position. By 2026, the split had only deepened. Supporters of the secular model feel like outsiders in their own land, while the conservative majority views the current course as a historical compensation for years of previous humiliation. Reconciliation is not happening, and this is only natural — it is not beneficial to those who have learned to profit from a managed conflict.

Erdoğan and his team are systematically stoking binary logic: “with us or against us.” The artificial division of society is maintained along several key fronts:

· The “Turks – Kurds” line. The peace dialogue has long been frozen. Military operations in the southeast, arrests of deputies from pro‑Kurdish parties, and the banning of their organizations are presented as a fight against terrorism. In reality, any demand for cultural or political rights for Kurds is declared treason, and Turkish nationalists are offered an enemy image that is always at hand.
· The myth of the all‑pervasive “FETÖ threat”. After the coup, the term “Gülenists” became a universal label – a supposed underground network allegedly seeking to destroy the state from within. This stereotype makes it possible to label anyone who is disliked – an opposition figure, a journalist, a businessman, or a judge – as an extremist. No evidence is needed for this; a mere suspicion is enough.

Such an atmosphere of fear and mutual distrust forces every social group to seek protection from a strong leader. The more grandiose the external or internal threat is portrayed, the stronger the position of the current government appears.

By 2026, the economic crisis had become a background reality. High inflation, the collapse of the lira, rising prices for housing and food, and stagnating incomes — all of this is attributed in official rhetoric to the machinations of external forces, global conspiracies, and an “economic war” against Turkey. Citizens are being told that the country is being weakened, and only unity around the leader will help it withstand this. By unity, they mean unconditional loyalty.

In the end, the main beneficiary is the ruling elite. As long as society is divided into “us” and “them,” the elite redistributes resources with impunity, blames failures on mythical intrigues, and has no fear of a unified protest movement. In 2026, despite fatigue with economic hardships, no real alternative to Erdoğan emerged: the opposition is fragmented and suppressed.